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If political decision-making aims at getting a particular result, like iden-
tifying just laws or policies that truly promote the common good, then
political institutions can also be evaluated in terms of how often they
achieve these results. Epistemic defenses of democracy argue that democ-
racies have the upper hand when it comes to truth, identifying the laws
and policies that are truly just or conducive to the common good. A
number of epistemic democrats claim that democracies have this benefi-
cial connection to truth because of the type of deliberative environment
created by democratic political institutions. Democratic political cultures
make it easier to exchange and give reasons, ultimately improving the jus-
tification that citizens have for their political beliefs. With this improved
justification comes a better chance at truth, or so the story goes. In this
paper, I show that attempts to forge a connection between justification
and truth in epistemology have encountered numerous difficulties, mak-
ing the case that this causes trouble for deliberative epistemic defenses of
democracy as well. If there is no well-defined connection between truth
and justification, then increasing the justification that citizens have for
their beliefs may not also increase the likelihood that those beliefs are
true, revealing a serious flaw in charting a connection between political
justification and political truth.1
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Epistemic Democracy and the Truth Connection
Introduction
Epistemic theories of democracy hold that democratic political institutions have
a valuable connection to truth. On some accounts, democratic procedures are
thought to always select the optimal political policy. Other perspectives argue
that, while democracies do not ensure that the best policy will always be chosen,
democratic decision-making increases the likelihood of selecting such policies.
This is the first component of epistemic defenses of democracy, that democra-
cies have a truth-tracking feature that makes them preferable to other political
institutions:
Truth-Tracking – Democracies track the truth better than other polit-
ical institutions
According to Truth-Tracking, democracies have a tighter connection with
truth than other sorts of political institutions. This truth-tracking feature of
democracies plays out in terms of the laws and policies selected by democratic
institutions – these institutions are better, the thought goes, at selecting the
best legislation. The shape of such legislation depends on the task at hand. In
some contexts, the goal is to select just laws and policies. In others, the aim is
to choose legislation that will be most effective in securing the common good.
Of course, in many instances, it could be that making laws that promote jus-
tice and laws that secure the common good coincide.2 Truth-Tracking can,
in principle, be applied to all of these scenarios – it is possible to ask whether
a law truly reflects the principles of justice or truly provides for the common
good. The common thread running through Truth-Tracking arguments in
favor of democracy is that democratic decision-making is preferable because of
its ability to track the truth about these important matters.
It is not by chance that democracies are thought to satisfy Truth-Tracking. In-
stead, many advocates of truth-tracking theories, like David Estlund and Helene
Landemore, hold that democracies are effective at tracking the truth because
a democratic political culture improves the epistemic justification that citizens
have for their political beliefs.3 For this reason, there is taken to be a tight
connection between Truth-Tracking and Justification:
Justification – Democratic political cultures create deliberative environ-
ments that increase the justification that citizens have for their political
beliefs
2One common criticism of truth-tracking arguments for democracy is that it is nonsensical
to talk about a “true” political policy. For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that
sense can be made of truth-tracking within the political sphere, though if it cannot, this poses
another serious problem for truth-tracking cases for democracy. For a defense of this idea and
the role that truth plays in political deliberation, see Estlund (2009), Ch. 2 and Landemore
(2012), Ch. 8.
3Discussions of political institutions often debate whether or not such institutions are
justified, but that is not the sort of justification I have in mind. By ‘epistemic justification,’
I refer to the notion of justification central to epistemology, the justification of belief.
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The thought with Justification is that there are features of the political cul-
tures of democracies that make citizens better justified in their political beliefs.
These characteristics include cognitive diversity, egalitarian sharing of reasons,
and equal access to debate. A number of truth-tracking accounts of democracy
thus have two features – that democratic procedures are more likely to select
correct political policies and that this is the case because voters are better jus-
tified in their political beliefs. The thought goes that, when citizens have better
justified political beliefs, this results in better policy-choice so far as the truth is
concerned. In Section 1, I examine Estlund’s and Landemore’s accounts of epis-
temic democracy, noting that they emphasize not only the truth of the policies
selected by democratic institutions, but also that correct selection occurs due
to the justification citizens have for their political beliefs. These accounts take
it that, because democracies fulfill Justification, they will also satisfy Truth-
Tracking.
In Section 2, I point out that a key assumption of this two-pronged strategy, that
there is a well-defined connection between truth and justification, has serious
difficulties. A necessary assumption for such epistemic defenses of democracy
to go through is that epistemic justification has a connection to truth. A con-
stituency with better justified beliefs can only more effectively identify the truth
if having better justified beliefs in fact makes one better at locating the truth.
This of course is a very natural thought, that justification marches lockstep with
likelihood of truth, but it is a thought that has failed to be substantiated within
contemporary epistemology, undermining democratic theories that appeal to the
connection between justification and truth. There is thus a substantial difficulty
for Truth-Tracking defenses of democracy that also depend on Justification,
a challenge which I detail in Section 3.
I conclude the paper in Section 4 by showing that the combination of Justifica-
tion and Truth-Tracking in many theories of epistemic democracy obscures
an important choice point in epistemic defenses of democracy more generally:
Would we rather have better justified laws or laws that hew closer to the truth?
If the arguments of this paper are correct, these two questions come apart at a
fundamental level, requiring that political theorists get clearer about what they
are pursuing when they advocate an epistemic defense of democracy. Views
that focus on the ways in which democracies improve the reasons citizens have
for their belief, rather than substantiating Truth-Tracking instead suggest ac-
counts on which democracies select, not policies that are more likely to be true,
but policies that are better justified than alternatives.
One issue that is relevant before we begin is that there has already been a fair
amount of work criticizing Truth-Tracking. The general thrust of these objec-
tions has been that, as a matter of fact, actual democracies do not do a good job
of tracking the truth. The reasons this is thought to occur are myriad: The pres-
sure for consensus drives groupthink rather than critical evaluation, voters have
little incentive to be well-informed about political issues, and politicians have
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more reason to cultivate rhetorical flair rather than political expertise. What
these worries all have in common is that they attempt to deny Truth-Tracking
by undermining Justification. It is thought that, because of groupthink, voter
ignorance, or political incompetence, it is not plausible that citizens have bet-
ter reasons for their political beliefs.4 My critique, however, goes further. I
argue that, even if the issues that lead to problems with Justification can be
resolved, this still will not mean that democratic institutions satisfy Truth-
Tracking. My argument instead drives a wedge between Justification and
Truth-Tracking, pointing out that even if advocates of epistemic democracy
can rebut the criticisms of Justification, this is not yet to argue that democ-
racies satisfy Truth-Tracking, showing that resolving those issues is not the
only challenge facing deliberative epistemic defenses of democracy.
1 Truth-Tracking Conceptions of Democracy
1.1 Preliminaries
There are a number of different positions on offer that fall under the banner of
epistemic defenses of democracy – what they all have in common is a commit-
ment to Truth-Tracking. Not all such views, however, will be the target of
this paper. I will only be interested in views that endorse both Justification
and Truth-Tracking. There are thus a number of epistemic arguments for
democracy that escape the criticisms of this paper.
One variety of epistemic defense of democracy that does not explicitly endorse
Justification are accounts that rest on preference aggregation. According to
this sort of epistemic argument for democracy, democratic procedures are valu-
able for selecting the best political policy because they are an ideal way to
aggregate preferences. On this model, what matters is combining the individual
preferences of all citizens, and counting votes makes such a tabulation possible,
thus giving rise to the policy that best satisfies individual preferences. Though
this type of view faces several difficulties, preference aggregation accounts are
not the target of this paper. Even though these accounts may be committed to
discovering the truth about the preferences of its citizens, preference aggrega-
tion defenses of democracy are not committed to Justification. In this model,
it does not necessarily matter how citizens arrived at the preferences they have
– what counts is whether democratic procedures are effective for aggregating
those individual preferences that already exist. Because aggregation views of
democracy do not take up Justification, the arguments of this paper are not
directed towards such views.
Another sort of view that lies beyond the purview of this paper are the results
touted by the Condorcet Jury theorem. Condorcet showed that, if independent
voters are each more likely than not to get the right answer about a political
4For views along these lines, see Brennan, (2016), Caplan (2007), Solomon (2006), and
Somin (2016).
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question, then a large numbers of voters virtually ensures that the best political
policy will be chosen.5 One assumption of Condorcet’s theorem, however, is that
citizens form their views independently of other voters, practically the antithe-
sis of the deliberative environment encouraged by Justification. According to
Justification, it is precisely because voters do not form their political beliefs
independently that they better track the truth. Thus, even though defenses of
democracy that rely on Condorcet do advocate Truth-Tracking, they do not
do so because of Justification. If all voters form their beliefs independently,
then there is no collective deliberation about political decisions. For this reason,
epistemic defenses of democracy that rely on the Condorcet result are also not
the target of this paper.6
Instead of focusing on preference aggregation or Condorcet-motivated views of
epistemic democracy, this paper instead hopes to make a criticism of epistemic
defenses of democracy that advocate both Justification and Truth-Tracking.
On such views, it is because democracies create particular kinds of epistemic
environments that they satisfy Truth-Tracking, not because democracy is ef-
fective for preference aggregation or independent belief formation. The target
of this paper then are views that take the middle route to Truth-Tracking in
Figure 1 that argue that democracy tracks the truth because of their unique
deliberative environments. For the sake of clarity then, I will refer to such de-
fenses of democracy as deliberative epistemic defenses of democracy.
Figure 1: Deliberative Epistemic Democracy
5For a discussion of the original jury theorem and various ways to strengthen its results,
see List and Goodin (2001).
6Through for work that modifies the independence assumption in order to account for real
world deliberation, see Goodin and Spiekermann (), pp. 67-82
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1.2 Deliberative Epistemic Democracy
One recent account of deliberative epistemic democracy that traces a connection
between Justification and Truth-Tracking is David Estlund’s Democratic
Authority. Estlund holds that democracies are preferable because of their effec-
tiveness in identifying the true requirements of justice. This epistemic power is
quite modest – on Estlund’s view, democracies are (1) better than random in
selecting the true principles of justice and (2) better than other political arrange-
ments.7 In this way, Estlund’s account has a truth-tracking component. Why
think that democracy does better than other political arrangements at select-
ing the true principles of justice? Estlund holds that democracies are effective
at approximating model epistemic deliberation in that they promote everyone
having equal opportunity for sharing their reasons for their political beliefs.8
With access to more evidence for and against what they believe, citizens are
able to take more into account when forming their political beliefs. Because
citizens are able to appreciate more relevant reasons and have better justified
beliefs than they would have otherwise, the likelihood that their judgments will
lead to the best outcome increases. The reason then that Truth-Tracking
occurs is because democracy supports the kind of epistemic environment that
also satisfies Justification. Estlund’s account of democracy thus ties together
these two strands – both truth and justification play a role in his deliberative
epistemic defense of democracy.
Another recent example that draws a link between Truth-Tracking and Jus-
tification is Helene Landemore’s deliberative epistemic argument for democ-
racy in Democratic Reason. According to Landemore, democracies are better
than other political arrangements at selecting the best political policies.9 Like
Estlund, Landemore argues that democratic procedures are both better than
random at identifying the best political policies and more effective than other
political arrangements, including dictatorships, oligarchies, and epistocracies.
This, of course, is the Truth-Tracking plank of epistemic defenses of democ-
racy – that democracies have an inside-track when it comes to making the right
political decisions. What is it about democracies that give them this epistemic
power? Landemore makes the case that cognitive diversity plays an important
role in effective group decision-making, the kind of diversity that democracy is
well-positioned to capture. Cognitive diversity has this beneficial effect on group
deliberation because a diverse group of citizens bring more to the table, both
in terms of potential solutions and reasons for and against adopting different
7See Estlund (2009), p. 98. Estlund also holds that the policy selection procedure must be
acceptable to all qualified points of view, a criterion he uses to rule out forms of government
that are not justifiable via public reason. The epistemic element of Estlund’s view is thus only
one component of his defense of democracy. For how the qualified acceptability requirement
bears on the arguments of this paper, see Section 4.
8See Estlund (2009), Ch. 9.
9For those who are concerned that it might be ultimately incoherent to describe political
policies as satisfying some external criterion of correctness, Landemore (2012) offers a defense
of this supposition (Ch. 8).
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solutions.10 This exposure to a diversity of reasons and solutions then improves
the ability of the group to identify the best solution to the problem. Landemore
thus argues that, to the extent that democracies are the most cognitively diverse
political arrangement, they also satisfy Truth-Tracking. Here, then, we can
see the connection again between Justification and Truth-Tracking. It is in
virtue of the deliberative process captured by democratic political cultures that
citizens improve the reasons for their political beliefs, leading to better political
decisions.
Even though Estlund and Landemore give different reasons for the epistemic
powers of democracy, they both forward deliberative epistemic defenses of democ-
racy. On the one hand, Estlund argues for the Truth-Tracking conclusion be-
cause democracy provides all citizens with equal opportunity for sharing their
reasons and viewpoints, coming closest to instantiating model epistemic deliber-
ation. Landemore, on the other hand, contends that cognitive diversity is what
enables democracy to satisfy Truth-Tracking. What they have in common
is that they both defend Truth-Tracking because of Justification, that it is
the deliberative environment created by democracies that enable them to make
the best political decisions. These, then, are the sorts of views that are issue in
this paper, views which require a connection between justification and truth in
order to make a case for Truth-Tracking.
2 The Truth Connection in Epistemology
Theories of epistemic democracy accept Truth-Tracking, that there is a close
connection between democratic procedures and truth. A number of these ac-
counts, views like Estlund’s and Landemore’s, hold that the connection with
truth is forged due to Justification. On these accounts, democratic procedures
give way to better judgments because collective democratic decision-making
makes citizens better justified in their political beliefs. There is thus a hope
running throughout deliberative epistemic democracy that there is a connection
between better justified political beliefs and better policies, that Justification
leads to Truth-Tracking. Close attention to recent work in epistemology,
however, undermines such optimism. As we will see, the thought that justified
beliefs have a particular relationship to truth has not been able to be substan-
tiated. In this section, I will survey possible routes to securing a connection
between justification and truth, ultimately concluding that none of them will
provide a firm foundation for those who offer an epistemic defense of democracy.
Before we examine these views on the connection between truth and justifica-
tion, I should note that I do not take the objections listed in this section to be
decisive. There are a number of possible avenues for response, many of which
I make note, and I will not have the space here to consider all such possibili-
ties. My intention, rather, is to illustrate the difficulties that have prevented
10See Landemore (2012), p. 102.
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each of these proposals from enjoying wide endorsement within epistemology.
Likewise, I do not take the options presented in this section to be logically ex-
haustive of the possible links between truth and justification – there are other
possibilities, and variations on those possibilities, that will not be surveyed here.
Summarizing the difficulties, however, of some of the most prominent proposals
attempting to connect truth with justification makes clear why there is no con-
sensus in epistemology that justification is coupled with truth. This fact alone
is enough to make trouble for the deliberative epistemic democrat – until we
have a better idea of how justification is connected to truth, we also will not
know if Justification actually leads to Truth-Tracking.
2.1 Entailment
An early view of epistemic justification that attempted to make the connection
between justification and truth explicit was Descartes’s view that having a jus-
tified belief that p entails that p is true. The Cartesian thought is that no belief
should be taken on unless it is beyond doubt, and a belief is beyond doubt only
when it follows deductively from one’s evidence. The cogito then gains purchase
because, regardless of how deceived I am, it is entailed by the fact that I am
thinking that I exist. The failure of the Cartesian project, however, came be-
cause this standard of justification is far too strong. There are many everyday
propositions that we are justified in believing that are nevertheless not entailed
by our experiences. It is conceptually possible that many of our beliefs are due
to the machinations of a Cartesian demon, but we are nevertheless justified in
our ordinary beliefs about the external world. The majority of philosophers have
thus taken the lesson from DesCartes that the relationship between justification
and truth is something less than entailment.11
2.2 Process Reliabilism
Because the Cartesian project was ultimately untenable, epistemologists have
explored views of epistemic justification on which the connection with truth is
weaker than entailment. An influential view in this spirit is process reliabilism.
Reliabilism attempts to characterize justification in terms of how well certain
processes of belief formation result in true beliefs. For simplicity’s sake, let’s
consider a process reliable if it produces more true than false beliefs.12 Reliabil-
ism is one strategy for attempting to make the relationship between justification
and truth explicit without a Cartesian entailment requirement. On reliabilism,
11It should be noted that Descartes does not explicitly discuss epistemic justification. In-
stead, he discusses when one ought to assent to beliefs. One promising interpretation of this
view, of course, is that Descartes is taking a stand on when one is justified in holding a belief,
see Bonjour (2009), pp. 39-40. Even if this is not the best way to characterize Descartes,
however, there are nevertheless others who have defended a connection of entailment between
justification and truth, see McGrew (1995 and 1998).
12This is a toy theory of reliability in comparison to Goldman’s original thoughts on re-
liability, but it should be adequate to point out the difficulties for process reliabilism (See
Goldman (1979) p. 11).
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what it is to have a justified belief is to have a belief that was produced by a
truth-related process, in this case, a process that produces true beliefs better
than half of the time.
Process reliabilism failed, however, because the link it proposed between truth
and justification does not obtain. Believers can be justified regardless of the
truth-efficacy of their belief forming processes. Consider the following coun-
terexample to reliabilism:
New Evil Demon
Suppose that I have a counterpart in a possible world that is controlled
by a Cartesian demon. Everything appears to my counterpart precisely
as it appears to me and they have every reason to believe what I do in
the actual world. Now, as it turns out, their belief-forming processes are
completely unreliable due to the malevolence of the Cartesian demon.13
The counterpart is clearly justified in their beliefs, just as justified as I am in
the actual world, but none of their belief-forming processes are reliable. The
majority of their beliefs are false and always have been, but they are nevertheless
justified. The way the process reliabilist conceives of the interface between truth
and justification is thus misguided – justification does not require that a belief
is produced by a reliable process.14
2.3 Probability-Raising
In the wake of the failures of Descartes’s necessitation account and Goldman’s
process reliabilism, there have been other proposals for how to connect justifi-
cation with truth. One influential thought has been that, instead of the reasons
for p necessitating that p, the reasons for p instead just raise p’s probabil-
ity. A number of epistemologists have endorsed such a conception, with some
even taking it to be a fundamental assumption about epistemic justification.
Richard Fumerton, for example, says that ”whatever else epistemic justification
for believing some proposition is, it must make probable the truth of the propo-
sition believed.”15 Following closely on the heels of a probabilistic account of
justification is a probabilistic account of evidence. Just like with justification,
probabilistic accounts of evidence say that all evidence that p makes p more
13This example is due to Cohen (1984), p. 281.
14Though the New Evil Demon is widely taken to decisively show that reliable processes are
not necessary for justification, dissenters include Bach (1985), Brewer (1997), Engel (1992),
Goldman (1986), Littlejohn (2009), and Sutton (2005). Lasonen-Aarnio (Forthcoming) holds
that the counterpart in the demon scenario, while perhaps not having justified beliefs, never-
theless has reasonable beliefs. While distinct from justified belief, reasonable belief is exten-
sionally very close to justified belief and thus can account for the intuition that the counterpart
is doing something right in the New Evil Demon scenario.
15See Fumerton (2005), p. 205. For another formulation of justification in terms of proba-
bility, see Steup (2005).
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probable.16 The probabilistic conception of justification and evidence is thus
deeply ingrained in contemporary epistemology as an attempt to connect truth
and justification.
The difficult question for a probabilistic interpretation of justification, however,
is how to construe an epistemic notion of probability. The counterpart in the
demon world has very few true beliefs, so whatever notion of probability we
give will have to rule that their beliefs are probable given their reasons. One
potential thought is that they find themselves in quite an unusual world, and on
the whole, possible worlds in which agent’s have all of the counterpart’s reasons
for belief are like the actual world. This promising thought, however, is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to make good on. To begin with, there are an infinite
number of possible worlds, and so we will be appealing to equivalence classes of
infinite possibilities. On this way of understanding the problem though, there
is no way to capitalize on the thought that p is true in a greater proportion of
the worlds in which the subject has good reason to believe p. Worlds where the
subject has good reason to believe that p are either veridical or deceptive – in
the former case p is true and in the latter the subject is deceived. Because there
are an infinite number of veridical worlds, there is a way to sort the worlds such
that, for each deceptive world, it is sorted into an equivalence class with only
one deceptive world and an infinite number of veridical worlds. But because
there are also an infinite number of deceptive worlds, there is also a way to sort
the worlds where, for every single veridical world, there are an infinite number
of deceptive worlds. The parody argument thus shows that the thought that
a greater proportion of worlds where an agent possesses good evidence for p
are veridical is unfounded. Finding an understanding of probability that tracks
epistemic justification is thus a significant challenge.
Perhaps there is an interpretation of the sort of probability at play with jus-
tification that can respond the above worries – my goal is not to argue that
the objection I have offered is decisive. Rather, my objective is to note the
difficulties that have prevented epistemologists from widely accepting any ac-
count of the connection between truth and justification. Just as necessitation
and process reliabilist accounts of this link have serious issues, so do epistemic
interpretations of probability. The difficulty runs so deep, in fact, that many
16Those who defend a positive relevance account of evidence include Carnap (1962), Hesse
(1974), Kearns and Star (2009), Kronz (1992), Maher (1996), Roush (2004), and Swinburne
(1973). For those who are evidentialists, taking the degree of justification to be solely a factor
of evidential support, a probabilistic account of justification follows straightforwardly from a
probabilistic conception of evidence. This will not be true for those who think that there are
other factors involved in justification – Cohen’s (1998) view is that to have a justified belief
is to be able to rule out all salient error possibilities, with contextual effects altering what is
salient (p. 292, fn. 11), while Fantl and McGrath (2002) take which beliefs are justified to
be effected by whether one can act as if p given the stakes of one’s practical situation. On
these views, even though evidential support is not the only consideration when determining
the strength of one’s justification, the force of one’s evidence nevertheless also plays a role in
the justification of belief.
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epistemologists have simply abandoned the thought that epistemic probabilities
are connected to the truth, instead arguing that epistemic probabilities are just
subjective degrees of confidence. There is thus far from a consensus that the
probability-raising view of justification is correct, and if it is, whether these
probabilities have anything to do with truth.
3 The Truth Connection and Democracy
So what is the relationship between justification and truth? The failures of the
preceding accounts – entailment, process reliabilism, and probability-raising –
undermine the thought that there is a connection between justification and
truth, and many epistemologists now do not think that there is a way to make
sense of justification in terms of truth.17 Given that there is no accepted way
to secure the connection between justification and truth in epistemology, it will
also be difficult to make sense of the idea that Justification promotes Truth-
Tracking. The deliberative epistemic arguments for democracy that we have
seen, though, depend on the thought that, by improving the reasons that cit-
izens have for their beliefs, democracies will be better able to track the truth.
In this section, we will see that the ways to understand the proposals of de-
liberative epistemic democrats mirror the proposals that attempt to connect
epistemic justification and truth, revealing that the difficulty in epistemology
carries over to epistemic defenses of democracy.
Estlund and Landemore clearly do not think that democratic procedures guar-
antee Truth-Tracking, so the Cartesian view is off the table. The other views
though, process reliabilism and probability-raising, can make sense of some of
the comments by Estlund and Landemore. Suppose, for example, that we in-
terpret Estlund’s and Landemore’s comments about democracy having a better
than random chance of making the correct political decision as advocating that
democratic procedures are justified because they select the right answer more
than half the time. The best way to understand the epistemic defense of democ-
racy, then, is as a form of democratic reliabilism, that democracies are the best
political arrangements because they embody a reliable process, positioning epis-
temic democrats as depending on the reliabilist proposal as the correct account
of the connection between justification and truth.
Just as with process reliabilism, however, democratic reliabilism is decisively
refuted by the possibility of the demon world. The New Evil Demon world
demonstrates that there is no connection between justification-conferring pro-
cesses and truth. Likewise, a Democratic Demon scenario would be one in
which, despite using democratic procedures, no democratic political decisions
end up getting the right result because of the deception of a Cartesian demon.
Due to open deliberation and cognitive diversity, the citizenry of a demon world
democracy would be very well justified in their political beliefs, but that does
17See, for example, Berker (2013a and 2013b) and Cohen (1984).
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not also mean that they will have a better than random chance at identifying
the best policy. Because they suffer from demon-deception, their beliefs will be
mostly false, preventing them from making sound political decisions. Thus, even
if Estlund and Landemore are right that democracies satisfy Justification, this
does not guarantee that they also satisfy Truth-Tracking.
Perhaps, instead of taking Estlund and Landemore to be reliabilists, we should
take them instead as thinking that democratic procedures raise the probability
that a political decision is correct. That is an alternative way of understand-
ing democracy’s “better than random” chance of getting the right result, that
democratic deliberation makes the probability of getting the right answer great
than fifty percent. Estlund at points appears to explicitly endorse such a con-
ception, that policies chosen by democratic procedure are more likely than not
to be true.18 Like with reliabilism, however, because the probability-raising
conception of epistemic justification founders, a probability-raising conception
of democratic deliberation is also doomed. As with epistemic justification, there
is no sense in which, across infinite possible worlds, democracies are more likely
to choose the best policies than not. For this reason, deliberative epistemic
democrats should not want to be interpreted as endorsing a probability-raising
connection between Justification and Truth-Tracking.
The lesson from epistemological work on justification and truth should now be
clear. It is dubious that there is a well-defined connection between truth and
justification – likewise, there is a serious concern that there is no such con-
nection between Justification and Truth-Tracking. Deliberative epistemic
democrats may be right about Justification, that open deliberation and cog-
nitive diversity provide citizens with better reasons for their beliefs than they
otherwise would have had, but this is not enough to also claim Truth-Tracking
for democracy.
4 The Way Forward for Epistemic Democrats
Given the difficulty connecting truth and justification, how should deliberative
epistemic democrats proceed? A few avenues present themselves. Deliberative
epistemic democrats could attempt to save the link between justification and
truth, staking out a particular strategy for connecting truth and justification.
Making this case would restore the close association between Justification and
Truth-Tracking, making it viable to argue for both in a defense of democracy.
Failing this, however, deliberative epistemic democrats will have to make a
choice – what is the more important, foundational political value, Justification
or Truth-Tracking?
18See Estlund (2009), p. 114.
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4.1 Restoring the Link?
One way to restore the link between truth and justification would be to adopt
Knowledge First Epistemology as advocated by Timothy Williamson. On Williamson’s
view, epistemology went wrong when it tried to analyze knowledge. The task,
instead, is to understand epistemic notions like justification in terms of knowl-
edge. In keeping with this approach, Williamson proposes that knowledge is
what justifies belief: “In any possible situation in which one believes a proposi-
tion p, that belief is justified, if at all, by propositions q1, ..., qn (usually other
than p) which one knows.”19 Here Williamson stumps for a factive view of jus-
tification. Only truths can be known, so if one’s justification consists only of
knowledge, then the justification that a person has for their beliefs is completely
made up of truths.
At first glance, this seems advantageous for epistemic democrats. On Williamson’s
way of thinking, Justification and Truth-Tracking would not come apart –
the more truths that citizens know, the more justification they have for their
political beliefs. Using Knowledge First to restore the link between Justifica-
tion and Truth-Tracking, however, comes with a significant cost. Because
justification is limited to knowledge, the citizens in the demon world hardly
have any justification for their beliefs. Most of what they think they know is
false, precluding them from having justification for the majority of their beliefs,
including what they believe in the political realm. Williamson confirms that
this is the case by characterizing victims of skeptical scenarios as excused yet
nevertheless unjustified in their beliefs.20 This position is even worse than what
we saw in Section 3 – when Justification could diverge from Truth-Tracking,
democracy in the demon world could at least increase the justification that cit-
izens had for their beliefs even when it failed to increase the number of truths
that they believed. Now, however, inhabitants in the demon world are deprived
of both Justification and Truth-Tracking, hardly an inspiring defense of the
epistemic benefits of democracy.
Another possibility for restoring the link between truth and justification would
be to ask why we should be concerned with demon worlds or infinite sets of
possible worlds at all. What counts – what matters to Estlund and Lande-
more – is whether democracy is truth-tracking in the actual world. Why, then,
do we need to consider the epistemic merits of other possible worlds? While
promising, this line of response does have a significant drawback. The primary
worry of proceeding along these lines is that it makes the deliberative epistemic
case for democracy merely contingent – only in worlds like the actual world is
democracy the best form of governement. If deliberative epistemic democrats
are willing to accept that, in the demon world, democracy is no longer the best
19See Williamson (2000), p. 185.
20See Williamson (Forthcoming). Clayton Littlejohn, another recent advocate of the factiv-
ity of justification, stumps for the same view, that the deceived are excused but not justified,
see his (2012 and Forthcoming).
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form of government because it does not have a better than random chance at
securing the right result, then emphasizing the actual world will avoid worries
about the truth connection.
It is not clear, however, that deliberative epistemic democrats would be satisfied
with a merely contingent defense of democracy. Take, for instance, worlds in
which other political institutions come closest to tracking the truth. There
have been political states that are founded on the premise that our best access
to truth is via divine revelation, truths that cannot be established by human
reason. According to these political arrangements, the best epistemic form of
government is rule by those who have the best access to God’s revelation. In
the possible worlds where the best access to truth is in fact through divine
revelation, would epistemic democrats be open to defending theocracy?
4.2 Justification or Truth?
I seriously doubt that deliberative epistemic democrats would be satisfied with
a solely contingent defense of democracy. In particular, David Estlund already
has a ready response to the possibility of theocracy with his qualified acceptabil-
ity requirement. On Estlund’s view, it is not just the form of government that
gets closest to Truth-Tracking that is preferable. Such epistemic merits are
considered only once political institutions are “justifiable in terms acceptable
to all qualified points of view (where ‘qualified’ will be filled in by ‘reasonable’
or some such thing).”21 On Estlund’s view, the epistemic success of a form of
government is only considered if it is acceptable to all qualified or reasonable
points of view. Estlund uses this criterion in order to rule out forms of govern-
ment that might do better at Truth-Tracking than democracy. It may well
be that certain forms of epistocracy or theocracy will outperform democracy
so far as the truth is concerned, but it is also possible for reasonable people to
disagree about who the experts should be in such political arrangements, and so
the proposals fail to even get off the ground. Estlund could press the same point
against the theocracy proposal – presumably there will be qualified objections
to who the religious experts are in a theocracy. Such a move allows Estlund to
rule out theocracies before epistemic considerations come into play.
Deliberative epistemic democrats thus have a couple of options. They can re-
store the link by limiting their claims to the actual world, or they can keep their
global claims while adopting something like Estlund’s qualified acceptability re-
quirement. The first route is unappealing in that it makes the epistemic defense
of democracy merely contingent, putting pressure on the deliberative epistemic
democrat to adopt something like qualified acceptance. The difficulty with go-
ing this route, however, is that it raises a serious question about whether the
priority in choosing a a form of government is Truth-Tracking or Justifica-
tion. Do we want political institutions that track the truth or that people have
21See Estlund (2009), p. 41.
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the most reason to endorse? Deliberative epistemic democrats want us to think
we can have both, that Justification and Truth-Tracking march in lockstep,
but we have seen that work in contemporary epistemology has not borne this
assumption out.
Estlund’s qualified acceptability requirement avoids this worry by privileging
Justification over Truth-Tracking, but this is tantamount to entirely switch-
ing tacks when defending democracy. What is most fundamental, on Estlund’s
view, is that everyone has enough reason to endorse their political institutions,
whether or not those institutions are truth-conducive is a secondary considera-
tion. Arguing for a qualified acceptability requirement thus puts the emphasis
on the reasons citizens have for their political beliefs, not on the truth of those
beliefs, making the updated view quite distinct from strict Truth-Tracking. If,
in response to difficulties connecting Justification to Truth-Tracking, epis-
temic democrats opt for something like qualified acceptability, then perhaps
it is ultimately Justification that matters after all. Because it removes the
fundamental emphasis on truth, a move to qualified acceptability represents a
shift from a truth-centered focus to a justification-centered focus in defending
democracy, admitting the two do not always coincide.
If deliberative epistemic democrats were to make such a move, prioritizing justi-
fication over truth, then they would be departing from what is typically thought
of as an epistemic defense of democracy. As we saw in Section 1, what unites
epistemic cases for democracy is their defense of Truth-Tracking. The vari-
eties of epistemic democracy get to Truth-Tracking in different ways, whether
by preference aggregation of Condorcet-type considerations, but what unites
them as forms of epistemic democracy is a reliance on Truth-Tracking. For
this reason, if deliberative epistemic democrats adopt Justification at the ex-
pense of Truth-Tracking, it is not so clear that their view remains within the
camp of epistemic democrats.
Conclusion
Amongst epistemic defenses of democracy, deliberative epistemic democrats
have a unique strategy. Though all epistemic democrats argue that democracies
are effective at tracking the truth, deliberative epistemic democrats emphasize
the type of discursive environment created by democratic political cultures,
pointing out the epistemic virtues of these settings. Helene Landemore argues
that these environments capture the widest range of cognitive diversity, while
David Estlund contends that democratic political cultures best instantiate ideal
epistemic deliberation. What these views have in common is that they argue
that democratic citizens are better justified in their political beliefs and that
this explains why democracy is better at tracking the truth than other political
arrangements. Deliberative epistemic democrats have overlooked, however, that
there is no consensus in epistemology that there even is a connection between
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justification and truth, so even if Estlund and Landemore demonstrate Justi-
fication, this is not yet to show that Truth-Tracking also obtains. If it is
not possible to have both Justification and Truth-Tracking, how delibera-
tive epistemic democrats respond to this difficulty reveals what really matters
in political institutions. If we cannot have both, should we prefer political in-
stitutions that we have the most reason to accept, or those that best track the
truth?
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